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Who Ya Gonna Call? Confusion Reigns After the 
Supreme Court’s Failure to Define Testimonial 
and Analyst in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A narcotics detective takes the stand in a drug case.  He testifies that 
the substance the defendant had in his possession is consistent with 
heroin.  The defense attorney cross-examines the detective and discovers 
that the substance was never tested.  The prosecutor’s response: a motion 
to field test the substance in front of the jury.  The judge grants the 
motion.  The detective pulls a test kit from his pocket, testifies that he 
received two hours of online training on conducting drug tests, performs 
the test, and announces that the substance is in fact consistent with 
heroin.  The jury finds defendant guilty. 
This scene unfolded in the Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. 
Martel after a back-log at the state’s laboratory prevented timely testing 
of the substance in a drug case.1  The events in Martel transpired in the 
wake of United States Supreme Court precedent that may appear to 
promote the rights of defendants facing incriminating forensic evidence 
but has instead created chaos concerning the admissibility of such 
evidence.  In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Court reversed the 
defendant’s conviction for a drug offense because the prosecution 
admitted into evidence a laboratory report that stated the substance he 
was charged with possessing was cocaine.2  The analysts who prepared 
the report were never called to the stand, giving the defendant no 
opportunity for cross-examination.3  The majority opinion asserts that 
confrontation of forensic analysts who prepare reports used in criminal  
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 1. David E. Frank, Fall River District Court Drug Trial Raises Concern: Defense Bar 
Shocked In-Court Testing Allowed, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Nov. 9, 2009. 
 2. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2542 (2009). 
 3. Id. at 2531. 
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prosecutions can help defendants uncover incompetence or fraud that 
may all too often taint forensic evidence.4 
The Sixth Amendment explicitly gives defendants the right to 
confront witnesses: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”5  The 
Supreme Court has been honing the exact meaning of the Confrontation 
Clause for over one hundred years.6  In 2004, the Court held in Crawford 
v. Washington that to fully afford defendants the right to “confront” the 
witnesses against them, all out-of-court statements that are “testimonial” 
in nature must be barred as hearsay unless the witness is unavailable and 
the party against whom the testimony is offered had an opportunity for 
cross-examination either before or during the trial.7  Though its rule is 
triggered only when evidentiary statements are “testimonial,” the 
Crawford Court said: “We leave for another day any effort to spell out a 
comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”8  Instead, the Court listed a 
“core class of ‘testimonial’ statements,”9 which does not include forensic 
reports. 
On June 25, 2009, before fully clarifying the legal meaning of 
testimonial, the Supreme Court applied the conceptually incomplete term 
to the admissibility of forensic evidence in Melendez-Diaz.  The Court 
held that when the government introduced a forensic report stating that a 
tested substance contained cocaine, the report was testimonial.10  Thus, 
the Court concluded, the prosecution should have called the analysts who 
prepared it to the stand; in failing to do so, the prosecution deprived the 
defendant of his rights under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation 
Clause.11 
                                                     
 4. Id. at 2536–37. 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 6. See generally Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (analyzing the Confrontation 
Clause in the context of deceased witnesses). 
 7. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004). 
 8. Id. at 68 (emphasis added). 
 9. Id. at 51–52 (stating that the “core class” has been recognized to include “‘ex parte in-court 
testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, 
prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that 
declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially, extrajudicial statements . . . contained 
in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confession 
statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to 
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial (citations omitted)). 
 10. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009). 
 11. Id. 
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In explaining its decision, rather than settle the residual confusion 
surrounding the meaning of testimonial after Crawford,12 the Court 
further muddied the waters by failing to define analyst.  As a result, the 
scope of the decision is difficult to discern.  Furthermore, a vague 
footnote in the majority opinion states: “[W]e do not hold, and it is not 
the case, that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing 
the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the 
testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution’s case.”13  
Thus, the flimsy rule set forth in Melendez-Diaz seems to be that an 
analyst must take the stand when a testimonial report is admitted into 
evidence, but exactly who an analyst is or what testimonial means is 
anybody’s guess. 
State and lower courts’ interpretations of the holding are 
unsurprisingly narrow, with many finding testimonial reports to 
encompass a narrow range of documents.14  Furthermore, lower courts 
tend not to dwell on exactly who constitutes an analyst, often allowing 
individuals other than those who actually prepare reports to be called to 
the witness stand.15  The result is that modern Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence has not changed much in the wake of Melendez-Diaz, 
which was initially thought to be a landmark case.16  When the outcome 
of a case depends on the accuracy of forensic evidence, it seems that the 
confrontation rights of today’s defendants are no more protected than 
they were before the Court decided this “landmark” case. 
This Note argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Melendez-
Diaz is correct in that defendants should be able to confront the 
individuals who prepare the forensic reports used against them in 
criminal prosecutions.  However, the Supreme Court’s failure to define 
                                                     
 12. See John H. Blume & Emily C. Paavola, Crime Labs and Prison Guards: A Comment on 
Melendez-Diaz and Its Potential Impact on Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 3 CHARLESTON L. 
REV. 205, 219–20 (2009). 
 13. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1. 
 14. See infra Part III.A. 
 15. See, e.g., United States v. Darden, 656 F. Supp. 2d 560, 563 (D. Md. 2009) (distinguishing 
Melendez-Diaz because of testimony of lab supervisor who reviewed raw data found by analysts); 
People v. Rutterschmidt, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 408 (Ct. App. 2009) (distinguishing Melendez-Diaz 
because expert witness testified as to reliability of report but report was not admitted into evidence), 
review granted, 220 P.3d 239 (2009); Smith v. State, 28 So. 3d 838, 854 (Fla. 2009) (allowing 
evaluation of report by supervisor of analysis team); Pendergrass v. State, 913 N.E.2d 703, 707–08 
(Ind. 2009) (concluding that reliability of evidence could be tested by cross-examination of expert 
witness); State v. Mobley, 684 S.E.2d 508, 511 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (allowing testimony of expert 
witness who did a technical review of report). 
 16. See Tom Jackman, Lawmakers Intervene in DUI Issue: Emergency Bill Intended to Ease 
Burden on State Analysts, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 2009, at B08 (calling Melendez-Diaz a landmark 
case). 
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analyst and refine its meaning of testimonial, all while leaving a 
convenient loophole to exclude admittedly relevant testimony, causes 
lower courts to circumvent the logic that lies at the heart of Melendez-
Diaz. 
First, this Note will demonstrate that the Crawford Court’s choice to 
postpone defining testimonial led to disparities among types of forensic 
evidence.  Many courts distinguish cases to deem entire classes of 
forensic evidence, such as breathalyzer calibration reports and autopsy 
reports, nontestimonial.17  This allows prosecutors to avoid calling 
forensic analysts to testify.18  Second, courts frequently allow individuals 
other than those who prepare evidentiary laboratory reports to testify 
against defendants,19 often justifying the procedure by citing the 
Melendez-Diaz majority’s first footnote.20  This Note concludes that, to 
uphold the Confrontation Clause, the Supreme Court should revisit the 
issue to solidify its definition of testimonial.  The Court should also 
define analyst as the individual who prepares a forensic report, requiring 
that individual to appear in court to testify every time such a report is 
used against a defendant in a criminal prosecution. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Earlier Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence Valued Face-to-Face 
Confrontation and Reliability of Evidence 
The Supreme Court first considered the Confrontation Clause in an 
1895 case, Mattox v. United States.21  There, the Court noted that a 
defendant gains an advantage by seeing his accuser “face to face, and 
[by] subjecting him to the ordeal of a cross-examination.”22  Another 
major Confrontation Clause development focused less on face-to-face 
confrontation.23  In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court ruled that Confrontation 
Clause requirements are met when evidence contains sufficient “‘indicia 
                                                     
 17. See, e.g., State v. Bergin, 217 P.3d 1087, 1090 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that 
breathalyzer calibration records are nontestimonial); Wood v. State, 299 S.W.3d 200, 209–10 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 2009) (holding that autopsy reports are nontestimonial when an autopsy is conducted in the 
presence of a police officer). 
 18. Bergin, 217 P.3d at 1088; Wood, 299 S.W.3d at 207. 
 19. See cases cited supra note 15. 
 20. See, e.g., Carolina v. State, 690 S.E.2d 435, 436 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). 
 21. 156 U.S. 237 (1895). 
 22. Id. at 244. 
 23. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36 (2004). 
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of reliability.’”24  Such reliability is demonstrated when evidence is 
backed by “a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”25  
This holding seemed to favor the perceived “reliability” of evidence 
while minimizing the value that the Court historically placed on face-to-
face confrontation.26 
B. Crawford v. Washington and Davis v. Washington Demand Live 
Testimony 
The Court seemed to renew its old appreciation for face-to-face 
confrontation a quarter-century later in Crawford v. Washington.27  The 
petitioner, Crawford, was charged with stabbing a man in the presence of 
Crawford’s wife, Sylvia.28  Crawford claimed self-defense and the 
government sought to admit an audio recording of Sylvia’s conversation 
with police because her account of the events refuted her husband’s self-
defense claim.29  The Court reasoned that admission of the tape was 
erroneous because the Confrontation Clause “applies to ‘witnesses’ 
against the accused—in other words, those who ‘bear testimony.’”30  
Sylvia, the Court reasoned, bore testimony because she made “‘[a] 
solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or 
proving some fact.’”31  Because Sylvia admitted that she did not observe 
the victim with a weapon, the fact her declaration proved was that her 
husband did not act in self-defense.32 
Crawford’s ultimate ruling was that “[t]estimonial statements of 
witnesses absent from trial [may be] admitted only where the declarant is 
unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to 
cross-examine.”33  Despite the importance of the word testimonial, the 
Court decided not to generate a “comprehensive definition of  
 
                                                     
 24. Id. at 66 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972)). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See John G. Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1797, 
1801 n.10 (2001). 
 27. 541 U.S. at 33. 
 28. Id. at 38. 
 29. Id. at 39–40. 
 30. Id. at 51 (quoting 2 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(1828)). 
 31. Id. (quoting WEBSTER, supra note 30). 
 32. Id. at 39–40. 
 33. Id. at 59. 
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‘testimonial.’”34  Instead, it merely listed the aforementioned “core class 
of ‘testimonial’ statements,”35 which did not include forensic reports. 
The Supreme Court attempted to clarify the meaning of testimonial 
two years later in Davis v. Washington.36  There, it held that testimonial 
statements are those that “do precisely what a witness does on direct 
examination.”37  This attempt at clarification helps little when it comes to 
forensic reports, however, even if a court finds a forensic report 
unquestionably testimonial under the Davis standard.  The question then 
becomes, under Melendez-Diaz, who is the “witness” who must testify 
regarding the validity of the report? 
C. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts Addresses the Admissibility of 
Forensic Reports 
Melendez-Diaz began as a simple, “garden-variety” drug case with 
no particularly unique qualities.38  The facts are fairly simple.  In 2001, 
police acted on a tip of suspicious activity in a K-Mart parking lot.39  An 
employee frequently received phone calls shortly before a blue sedan 
picked him up, and then the same car would return him to work.40  As the 
tip predicted, police saw the employee get into a blue sedan, and it 
returned a short time later.41  The officers searched the employee and 
found “a substance resembling cocaine.”42  Two other men in the car 
were arrested, including Luis Melendez-Diaz.43  On the way to the 
station, the officers noticed the men fidgeting in the patrol car and later 
found bags of a white substance hidden in the back seat.44  Melendez-
Diaz stood trial on charges of trafficking and distributing cocaine.45  At 
trial, the court admitted the bags of what appeared to be cocaine 
accompanied by certificates of analysis stating: “‘The substance was 
found to contain: Cocaine.’”46  The person who conducted the drug test 
                                                     
 34. Id. at 68. 
 35. Id. at 51. 
 36. 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 37. Id. at 830. 
 38. David E. Frank, A “Sleeper” Mass. Case Takes an Unlikely Path to the Supreme Court, 
MASS. LAW. WKLY., Mar. 31, 2008. 
 39. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2530 (2009). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 2531. 
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did not appear to testify,47 and Melendez-Diaz argued that the certificates 
were inadmissible because Crawford v. Washington mandates in-person 
testimony by the forensic analyst who attests to forensic reports.48 
The court allowed the admission of the reports without the analyst’s 
testimony, and Melendez-Diaz was found guilty.49  He appealed, arguing 
that the admission of the certificates violated his Sixth Amendment 
confrontation rights.50  The Appeals Court of Massachusetts affirmed the 
district court’s ruling.51  The Supreme Court granted certiorari52 and 
reversed the judgment,53 concluding that the certificates were part of the 
“‘core class of testimonial statements’”54 that requires in-court testimony 
under the Court’s holding in Crawford v. Washington.55 
In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia insisted that the Court 
straightforwardly apply Crawford to conclude that forensic science 
reports are testimonial documents and the analyst who prepared them 
must be available for in-court confrontation under the Sixth 
Amendment’s directive.56  The majority assured prosecutors that 
Melendez-Diaz does not require everyone who had a hand in the final 
preparation of the forensic report to testify: “[W]e do not hold . . . that 
anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of 
custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, 
must appear in person . . . .”57  This footnote is frequently cited in the 
opinions of lower courts to justify an absence of analyst testimony.58  
The Supreme Court should clarify this footnote so that lower courts may 
not use it to skirt Melendez-Diaz’s apparent requirement that analysts 
must testify, especially in light of current problems with forensic 
evidence. 
                                                     
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 2542. 
 54. Id. at 2532 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)).. 
 55. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 56. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532. 
 57. Id. at 2532 n.1. 
 58. See infra Part III.C. 
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1.  Credibility Problems Exist with Forensic Evidence 
Forensic evidence is an essential tool used in criminal trials to 
separate the guilty from the innocent.59  To accomplish this, of course, 
“[o]ur criminal justice system . . . must rest on facts.”60  While forensic 
evidence can bring facts to light, the current system suffers from a lack 
of standardization, which was recently analyzed in the National 
Academy of Science’s (NAS) in-depth report on the current state of 
forensic evidence.61 
The Melendez-Diaz majority opinion repeatedly cited the NAS 
report, which is hailed as “one of the most important developments in 
forensic science since the creation of the first crime laboratory in this 
country.”62  The report “raises the worrisome prospect that the quality of 
evidence presented in court . . . can vary unpredictably according to 
jurisdiction.”63  Promoting reliability of forensic evidence and 
consistency among jurisdictions, therefore, appears essential.  The report 
concludes that forensic science in the United States needs significant 
improvement.64  Thus, courts must equip themselves to properly admit 
forensic evidence because, in the future, technology will play an 
increasingly larger role in criminal trials.65  Unfortunately, Melendez-
Diaz, rather than becoming a tool to curb inconsistencies among 
laboratories, is creating a slew of inconsistencies in the courtroom. 
                                                     
 59. Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary), http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=4038&wit_id=2629 
(last visited Sept. 15, 2010). 
 60. Id. 
 61. COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS., NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, 
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 6 (2009) 
[hereinafter NAT’L RES. COUNCIL]. 
 62. Hearing, supra note 59, at 2 (statement of Prof. Paul C. Giannelli), 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/09-09-09%20Giannelli%20testimony.pdf. 
 63. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 61, at 16. 
 64. See id.; see also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2009) (citing the 
“serious problems” noted in the report). 
 65. See, e.g., Dina Temple-Raston, FBI’s New Technology Revolutionizes DNA Analysis, NPR 
(Jan. 28, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18435256 (explaining how a 
new robotic device called a mass spectrometer will “open up all new kinds of evidence and all new 
kinds of cases” in the area of DNA analysis). 
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2. Justice Scalia’s Majority Opinion Fails to Spell Out a Workable Cure 
for the Problems Reported by the NAS Report 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, cited a portion of the NAS 
report stating that “‘[t]he forensic science system . . . has serious 
problems that can only be addressed by a national commitment to 
overhaul the current structure.’”66  He concluded that cross-examination 
will allow defendants to showcase “an analyst’s lack of proper training 
or deficiency in judgment.”67 
At first blush, it appears that the Court intended the Melendez-Diaz 
holding to be quite broad, designed to help cure current deficiencies in 
forensic evidence.  But according to Justice Scalia, the decision merely 
settles the question of whether the reports identifying the white substance 
as cocaine were testimonial and is a straightforward application of 
Crawford.68  The majority explained that the certificates were created 
“‘under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably 
to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,’” 
since the analysts were aware that the very reason the certificates were 
created was for use as evidence in a criminal case.69  Therefore, he 
concluded, the certificates were testimonial under Crawford.70 
While the Court’s use of a “reasonable belief” standard necessarily 
invites judicial interpretation and discretion, a comprehensive definition 
of what constitutes a testimonial forensic report would, in contrast, tell 
lower courts exactly when an analyst must testify.  Thus, by deeming the 
statements testimonial, the majority created an expansive gray area for 
judges who must decide whether a specific forensic report is testimonial, 
and, in turn, whether the analyst who created it must be called as a 
witness. 
The majority stressed that the procedural goal of the Confrontation 
Clause is to assess the reliability of evidence.71  Reliability is 
exceptionally important in the field of forensic testing, which is arguably 
neither neutral nor reliable in its current state.72  The Court argued that its 
holding would increase reliability, at least when it comes to analysts who 
lie or exaggerate, and that “[c]onfrontation is one means of assuring 
                                                     
 66. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2537 (quoting NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 61, at xx). 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. at 2533. 
 69. Id. at 2532 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004)). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 2536 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61). 
 72. Id. at 2536. 
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accurate forensic analysis. . . . [O]f course, the prospect of confrontation 
will deter fraudulent analysis in the first place.”73  The majority 
accurately pointed out that had the prosecution called the individuals 
who prepared the drug certificate to testify, the defendant in Melendez-
Diaz could have discovered the method the analysts used to reach their 
conclusion through cross-examination.74  But because the Court failed to 
define analyst, even in a post-Melendez-Diaz world, many defendants do 
not have access to the person best able to attest to the reliability of 
forensic evidence admitted into evidence.75  While the Court promoted 
the ideal of evidentiary reliability,76 it could have better served this goal 
by clearly defining a procedure lower courts must follow. 
3. Justice Kennedy’s Dissent Predicts the Impact of the Majority’s 
Failure to Define Testimonial and Analyst 
In his dissent, Justice Kennedy pointed out that the majority 
incorrectly based its ruling on Crawford and Davis because neither case 
mentioned forensic analysis.77  These cases present confrontation issues 
concerning witnesses who were present at the time of the crimes 
alleged,78 while forensic scientists are generally not present during a 
crime’s commission. 
Furthermore, in Crawford and Davis, the statements at issue 
concerned events that occurred in the past.  Forensic analysts, on the 
other hand, prepare their reports nearly contemporaneously with the 
observation of test results.79  Finally, the testimonial statements at issue 
in those cases were given in response to interrogation, completely unlike 
forensic reports.80  Justice Kennedy argued that this means the majority’s 
cited precedents were readily distinguishable from Melendez-Diaz,81 thus 
isolating a fundamental flaw in the majority’s reasoning—old standards 
are not readily applicable to forensic evidence and analysts, which do not 
fit neatly into traditional concepts of evidence and witnesses. 
Even if the majority opinion was properly rooted in precedent, the 
dissent showed that the ruling was written in a manner that makes it 
                                                     
 73. Id. at 2536–37. 
 74. Id. at 2537–38. 
 75. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 76. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536. 
 77. Id. at 2543 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 2551. 
 80. Id. at 2552. 
 81. Id. 
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difficult to apply practically.  One problem is Justice Scalia’s relentless 
reliance on the phrase “testimonial statements,” despite failing to explain 
exactly what testimonial means.  Notably, Justice Kennedy asserted that 
the Court only used the term testimonial in Crawford and Davis because 
“the adjective . . . avoid[ed] the awkward phrasing required by reusing 
the noun ‘witness.’”82  Rather than attempt to clarify testimonial himself, 
Justice Kennedy suggested that the term is not as important as the 
majority seemed to believe, analogizing modern-day analysts to 
constitutional-era copyists, whose affidavits were admitted into evidence 
without a confrontation requirement.83  In other words, the dissent 
seemed to think that the majority’s exaltation of testimonial evidence 
was a bit misplaced.  While this theory ignores the starring role that the 
term testimonial played in pre-Melendez-Diaz confrontation cases, such 
as Crawford, it makes for an interesting observation—without specifying 
exactly what the definition of testimonial is for scientific evidence, the 
majority opinion left so much room for interpretation that lower courts 
can treat the work of forensic analysts as casually as that of glorified 
copyists. 
The dissent next criticized the majority’s failure to define analyst.84  
Justice Kennedy predicted that some jurisdictions would require each of 
the many individuals involved in preparing a forensic report—each 
analyst—to testify in court.85  The impact of such a requirement would 
be that if even one of these people is unavailable, “the Court has, for all 
practical purposes, forbidden the use of scientific tests in criminal 
trials.”86  Justice Kennedy unapologetically pointed out the majority 
opinion’s leaps in logic regarding the terms testimonial and analyst.  His 
“slippery slope” critique, while perhaps far-fetched, nonetheless 
emphasized that because the majority failed to fully define and limit the 
scope of its decision, substantial problems were bound to arise. 
Unfortunately, many post-Melendez-Diaz decisions legitimize 
Justice Kennedy’s prediction; the majority opinion provided states and 
lower federal courts insufficient guidance to decide when forensic 
reports are admissible in court without live testimony.87  The result is that 
confrontation rights are not sufficiently protected in the modern scientific 
era. 
                                                     
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 2552–53. 
 84. Id. at 2544–47. 
 85. See id. at 2545–46. 
 86. Id. at 2544. 
 87. See infra Part III. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. Courts Deem Many Categories of Forensic Reports Nontestimonial 
Melendez-Diaz’s incomplete articulation of testimonial gives courts 
great leeway to decide that various types of forensic evidence do not fall 
under the scope of the Court’s holding.  Therefore, many defendants do 
not have the opportunity to confront the analyst who reported evidence 
via cross-examination.  Interestingly, soon after the Supreme Court 
decided Melendez-Diaz, courts immediately began to distinguish several 
categories of reports from other testimonial documents.88  Courts have 
now generally converged, and when dealing with many different types of 
evidence, the original analyst usually need not testify.89  The reporting 
analyst is so seldom required to testify, in fact, that it seems courts are 
taking liberties with Melendez-Diaz’s confusing language to justify 
admitting evidence in a convenient manner, rather than in the way that 
will best protect defendants’ constitutional rights. 
Among the reports declared by state and lower courts to be 
nontestimonial are military drug test results,90 certificates of accuracy for 
speed radar devices,91 and records for breathalyzer machines.92  Some 
courts even find defendants’ requests to examine reports related to the 
functionality of breathalyzer machines to be so overly broad and 
burdensome that such reports are not discoverable.93 
Courts’ justifications for finding reports nontestimonial vary.  For 
example, the Illinois Court of Appeals determined that autopsy reports 
are nontestimonial because they are business records and do not prove an 
element of the offense at issue.94  The Indiana Court of Appeals took a 
different approach, finding the certificate of accuracy for a breath-testing 
machine in a DUI case nontestimonial because it was not prepared for a 
single defendant and was not a formal affidavit.95  The California 
                                                     
 88. See cases cited supra note 15. 
 89. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 90. United States v. Skrede, 2009 WL 4250031, at *7 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 23, 2009) 
(explaining that military drug test results are nontestimonial business records). 
 91. United States v. Forstell, 656 F. Supp. 2d 578, 580–81 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
 92. State v. Bergin, 217 P.3d 1087, 1089–90 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). 
 93. See State v. McCurdy, No. 0909016626, 2010 WL 546499, at *3 (Del. Ct. Com. Pl. Feb. 3, 
2010) (request for calibration records overbroad and burdensome to the State); State v. Tindell, No. 
E2008-02635-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2516875, at *15–18 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 22, 2010) 
(source code for breathalyzer device not discoverable). 
 94. People v. Cortez, 931 N.E.2d 751, 756–57 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). 
 95. Ramirez v. State, 928 N.E.2d 214, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). 
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Supreme Court rationalized in People v. Geier that a DNA report is 
nontestimonial by a process of elimination: “[A] statement is testimonial 
if (1) it is made to a law enforcement officer or by or to a law 
enforcement agent and (2) describes a past fact related to criminal 
activity for (3) possible use at a later trial.  Conversely, a statement that 
does not meet all three criteria is not testimonial.”96 
With various avenues to declare reports nontestimonial available to 
courts, the scope of Melendez-Diaz is, in practice, extraordinarily 
narrow.  If the Supreme Court’s motive is truly to give defendants the 
opportunity to cross-examine analysts to unveil “an analyst’s lack of 
proper training or deficiency in judgment,”97 Melendez-Diaz’s lackluster 
requirements fail to empower defendants as intended. 
B. Melendez-Diaz’s Failure to Define Analyst Prompts Courts to Admit 
Results of Forensic Reports Without Accompanying Testimony of the 
Author 
Even when courts recognize reports as testimonial, which would 
seem to require the author’s appearance per Melendez-Diaz’s holding, 
numerous states allow individuals other than those who actually perform 
forensic reports to take the stand.98  Thus, contrary to Justice Scalia’s 
promise that defendants can cross-examine analysts to bring to light a 
lack of knowledge or to uncover a poor decision,99 few post-Melendez-
Diaz defendants have a meaningful opportunity to do so. 
In Pendergrass v. Indiana, the Indiana Supreme Court was one of the 
earlier courts to hold that the expert testimony of a supervisor may 
replace the testimony of the person who created a report.100  The court 
admitted testimony of a laboratory supervisor regarding the DNA 
                                                     
 96. People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 138–39 (Cal. 2007).  Notably, “[t]he California Supreme 
Court has recently granted review in four cases involving this issue, some of which concluded that 
Geier had been impliedly overruled, and some concluding it was still good law.” People v. 
Velazquez, No. E044109, 2009 WL 5062027, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2009).  See People v. 
Rutterschmidt, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390 (Ct. App. 2009), review granted, 220 P.3d 239 (2009); People v. 
Gutierrez, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 369 (Ct. App. 2009), review granted, 220 P.3d 239 (2009); People v. 
Dungo, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702 (Ct. App. 2009), review granted, 220 P.3d 240 (2009); People v. Lopez, 
98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 825 (Ct. App. 2009), review granted, 220 P.3d 240 (2009). 
 97. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2009). 
 98. See cases cited supra note 15. 
 99. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2537. 
 100. See generally 913 N.E.2d 703 (2009) (holding that admission of a certificate of analysis 
pertaining to DNA evidence with expert testimony but without testimony of the laboratory processor 
did not violate defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation). 
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analyses conducted by her employee instead of the employee herself.101  
The court reached its decision because “[t]he laboratory supervisor who 
took the stand did have a direct part in the process by personally 
checking [the employee’s] test results,” meaning that the supervisor was 
able to verify the tests’ accuracy, the standards followed in the lab, and 
whether the analyst followed those standards.102 
However, questioning a laboratory supervisor will probably not yield 
as much information as calling the person who actually conducted the 
tests to testify.  In Pendergrass, defense counsel asked the supervisor 
which of two tests were conducted first.103  She responded, “‘I don’t have 
any knowledge of that.’”104  When asked whether “anything indicated a 
difficulty in creating the DNA profile,”105 she had to review the tester’s 
notes, which were not admitted into evidence.106 
The supervisor’s testimony allowed for potentially unreliable 
evidence in three ways: (1) the supervisor was unfamiliar with the exact 
testing procedure, (2) she was unaware of whether the analyst 
encountered problems, and (3) the notes she reviewed were not admitted 
into evidence.  Thus, the Pendergrass court set a bad precedent by 
admitting less-than-reliable evidence.  First, that the supervisor was 
unfamiliar with the order in which the tests were performed calls into 
question the accuracy of the court’s assertion that she was familiar 
enough with the standard operating procedures in the laboratory to tell 
whether the analyst deviated from those procedures.107  Second, had the 
supervisor been aware of a specific problem with the report, the defense 
attorney could have been put on notice of a potential error and explored 
that topic further.  Presumably, the analyst herself would have been 
better able to assist the defendant in obtaining this information than her 
supervisor.  Finally, because the notes upon which the supervisor based 
her opinions were not admitted into evidence, the defendant and fact-
finder were deprived of the opportunity to compare the supervisor’s 
interpretation of the notes with the notes themselves.  The supervisor 
may have misread or misunderstood the notes, while the analyst herself 
would have been better able to explain exactly what happened during the 
tests. 
                                                     
 101. Id. at 707. 
 102. Id. at 707–08. 
 103. Id. at 705. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 707–08. 
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Other courts allow laboratory supervisors to testify in the actual 
analyst’s stead.  In State v. Dilboy, the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
sanctioned this method by taking a particularly narrow view of the 
Melendez-Diaz rule, stating that it addresses only a very “‘narrow 
category of testimonial statements,’” which is limited to “‘ex parte out-
of-court affidavits of laboratory analysts regarding . . . drug tests.’”108  In 
Dilboy, the defendant challenged the court’s decision to allow testimony 
of a laboratory supervisor—who testified that various drugs, including 
cocaine, were found in Dilboy’s blood and urine—because the supervisor 
did not perform the tests.109  In allowing the supervisor’s testimony, the 
court noted Melendez-Diaz’s oft-quoted disclaimer: “[I]t is not the case[] 
that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of 
custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, 
must appear in person as part of the prosecution’s case.”110 
Many other courts have held that, under Melendez-Diaz, the 
Confrontation Clause does not require the analyst who completed a 
forensic report used against a defendant to appear to testify.111  As courts 
skirt Melendez-Diaz’s apparent requirements, the idea that the person 
who prepared the records should be the same person who is called to the 
stand has all but vanished.  For example, in Haywood v. State, a case 
involving a drug affidavit very similar to that in Melendez-Diaz, a lab 
supervisor’s testimony was admissible on the grounds that she had 
reviewed the technician’s work for accuracy.112 
Eliciting testimony from laboratory supervisors is not uncommon, 
and courts are quick to demonstrate that this practice is consistent—or, at 
least, not inconsistent—with Melendez-Diaz.  For example, the Georgia 
Court of Appeals reasoned, “Melendez-Diaz specifically did not 
decide . . . whether the technician or chemist who actually performed the 
tests must testify at trial.”113  To justify its conclusion, the court cited 
Justice Scalia’s famous footnote promising that it is not necessary for 
anyone possessing relevant information regarding forensic reports to 
testify.114 
                                                     
 108. 999 A.2d 1092, 1108 (N.H. 2010). 
 109. Id. at 1101. 
 110. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts. 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 n.1 (2009). 
 111. See, e.g., Carolina v. State, 690 S.E.2d 435, 437 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); Haywood v. State, 
689 S.E.2d 82, 88 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). 
 112. 689 S.E.2d at 86. 
 113. Carolina, 690 S.E.2d at 436. 
 114. Id. at 436–37. 
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C. Analysts Should Be Required to Appear in Court to Testify Every 
Time Forensic Documents Are Used Against Criminal Defendants 
1. Melendez-Diaz’s Failure to Define Testimonial Diminishes 
Defendants’ Rights 
Defendants should have the unequivocal right to confront witnesses 
who present scientific evidence against them in criminal cases, but the 
majority diminished this right with its faulty reasoning.  Its use of poorly 
defined terms gives lower courts too much leeway when deciding how 
far the Confrontation Clause extends.  As stated above, Justice 
Kennedy’s fear that the majority gives states little guidance in 
implementing the new standard115 has indeed materialized.  Courts seem 
to dodge the burden of requiring in-court testimony whenever possible. 
On the other hand, some courts properly apply Melendez-Diaz and 
require analysts to appear to attest to forensic records.116  The rationale 
such courts employ is that “the United States Supreme Court has 
explicitly ruled that admission of such certificates without testimony 
from the authoring analyst violates the Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation”117 or that, in the wake of Melendez-Diaz, “a defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right is violated when the defendant is not allowed to 
confront the person who created the lab report used at his trial.”118  Note 
that these courts are not interpreting Melendez-Diaz to mean that 
defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to merely confront someone 
but, very specifically, to confront analysts who prepare evidence against 
them.  If Melendez-Diaz left room for substitute analysts’ testimony, the 
Court should have specified how far attenuated the testifying analyst may 
be from the person who actually created the report.  Better, the Court 
should have firmly ruled that there can be no substitutions. 
2. Analysts Are Not Interchangeable 
Even when documents are declared testimonial, almost universally, 
state and lower courts allow the testimony of experts in place of analysts’ 
                                                     
 115. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2544 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 116. See, e.g., Koenig v. State, 916 N.E.2d 200, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (applying Melendez-
Diaz to require live testimony to accompany admission of blood test certificates); Commonwealth v. 
Chery, 915 N.E.2d 284, 285–86 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009) (same regarding a ballistics report); 
Commonwealth v. DePina, 917 N.E.2d 781, 783 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009) (same regarding drug 
analysis report). 
 117. DePina, 917 N.E.2d at 789 (emphasis added). 
 118. Koenig, 916 N.E.2d at 201 (emphasis added). 
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when the substitute analysts (1) draw their own conclusions119 and (2) do 
not merely read from the primary analysts’ reports.120  These appallingly 
minimal requirements do nothing to remedy the vast problems 
documented in the NAS report cited by Justice Scalia.121  The Supreme 
Court should revisit the issue and seal the holes in its logic—particularly 
in the exceptionally leaky first footnote, which lower and state courts are 
tapping again and again to justify implementing minimal standards. 
The Melendez-Diaz majority claimed that the ruling would enable 
defendants to test the reliability of analysts’ work.122  Therefore, courts 
should not allow an expert or some other individual to testify in lieu of 
the analyst who actually prepared a report.  While expert testimony could 
allow defendants to confront someone regarding laboratory results and 
may enable a defense attorney to uncover an error in the report during 
cross-examination, this possibility will not promote evidentiary 
reliability to the same extent as confronting the analyst herself.  When an 
analyst lies to make a report appear accurate or makes a mistake during 
her analysis, an expert who reviews the records may have no way to 
expose the error.  Allowing testimony from substitutes—such as 
laboratory supervisors, co-workers, or independent experts—sets a 
dangerous precedent.  Even top experts in their fields are not omniscient 
and cannot tell the fact-finder with full certainty what transpired during 
the testing period.  Maybe the analyst herself can. 
On the topic of forensic reports, a Michigan defense attorney aptly 
noted, “‘You literally have to look at the science and challenge the 
science that’s out there.’”123  This statement was in response to the 
closure of a Detroit laboratory after error rates on forensic reports were 
found to be as high as ten percent.124  Confrontation, according to the 
attorney, means that “[t]he technician has to say, ‘This is what I did and 
                                                     
 119. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, Nos. 2:04-cr-71, 2:09-cv-294, 2010 WL 404072, at *4 
(N.D. Ind. Jan. 25, 2010) (permitting testimony by DEA forensic chemist who formed an expert 
opinion after reviewing and confirming the results generated by his partner); Rector v. State, 681 
S.E.2d 157, 160 (Ga. 2009) (allowing testimony by state’s toxicologist that drew independent 
conclusion from the report of another toxicologist); State v. Lui, 221 P.3d 948, 955–56 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2009) (admitting DNA analysis of one analyst via expert testimony of another). 
 120. See, e.g., State v. Locklear, 681 S.E.2d 293, 305 (N.C. 2009) (holding that testimony was 
not admissible when expert witness testified using an autopsy report prepared by another doctor who 
was not shown to be unavailable); State v. Galindo, 683 S.E.2d 785, 788 (N.C. 2009) (holding that a 
substitute chemist’s testimony was not admissible when based solely on the report of another 
analyst). 
 121. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2009). 
 122. Id. at 2538. 
 123. Carol Lundberg, Show Me the Lab Tech: U.S. Supreme Court Confrontation Clause 
Decision May Have Some Impact on Michigan After All, MI. LAW. WKLY., July 27, 2009. 
 124. Id. 
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this is how I did it,’ and answer questions on it.”125  This is a seemingly 
simple process. 
The Melendez-Diaz majority could have avoided considerably 
diminishing defendants’ rights had it ventured to make such a clear 
statement.  It did not.  And lower courts are seizing the opportunity to 
interpret the rule in the most convenient way possible, even if that means 
the problems cited in Melendez-Diaz persevere at the least and, at the 
worst, become substantially more damaging to defendants’ rights as 
forensic evidence is used increasingly in the courtroom.126 
3. Ignoring Evidentiary Problems Promotes Evidentiary Unreliability 
Many types of forensic evidence are used in courts on a regular 
basis, including fingerprints, DNA and other biological evidence, 
controlled substances, shoe prints and tire tracks, ballistics, hair and 
fibers, paint and coatings, and document analyses.127  As courts 
determine whether various types of reports are testimonial, the current 
trend allowing substitute analysts to testify is spreading throughout the 
entire field of forensic science.128  This result is incompatible with 
Melendez-Diaz’s general message that analysts must be available to 
testify on the accuracy of forensic evidence.129 
While “science has always been marked by upheaval as it evolves 
and transforms itself through discovery,”130 scientific breakthroughs 
come quickly and technology advances at increasingly rapid rates.  In 
contrast, the law has a reputation for resisting change, always a step 
behind science.131  When science and law come together to prove a 
defendant’s guilt through forensic evidence, the law must keep pace with 
science to ensure the reliability of this evidence.  The law does not enjoy 
the same luxury as science; it cannot afford to endure upheaval. 
Melendez-Diaz created upheaval by opening the door to evidentiary 
unreliability.  As demonstrated above, courts tend not to require the 
person who actually prepared scientific reports to explain the procedures 
behind those reports and the conclusions the reports contain, permitting 
                                                     
 125. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 126. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 127. See generally NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 61, at 127–81 (describing forensic science 
disciplines). 
 128. See supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text. 
 129. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532–33 (2009). 
 130. KELLY M. PYREK, FORENSIC SCIENCE UNDER SIEGE: THE CHALLENGES OF FORENSIC 
LABORATORIES AND THE MEDICO-LEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATION SYSTEM 8 (2007). 
 131. Id. at 15. 
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otherwise inadmissible reports on the theory that confrontation rights are 
protected when substitute analysts take the stand and testify as to the 
accuracy of another’s work.  Even if this person must be certified as an 
expert or otherwise considered qualified to interpret the report, this 
individual was not present when the test was conducted.  Certainly, 
however, the solution is not to require every expert to pull a drug test kit 
out of his pocket––such requirement would make a mockery of a 
constitutional guarantee.  Judicial efficiency may be promoted when 
analysts can remain in the laboratory instead of being hailed into court, 
but, as Justice Scalia emphasized, “The Confrontation Clause . . . is 
binding, and we may not disregard it at our convenience.”132 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should revisit the issue of the Confrontation 
Clause’s applicability to forensic evidence, paying close attention to the 
special evidentiary problems demonstrated in the NAS report.  A lack of 
national standardization makes it extremely important for every piece of 
forensic evidence to receive close scrutiny.  Until those national 
standards are in place, the Supreme Court must work to ensure that 
defendants have every opportunity to check the reliability of this type of 
evidence.  The first step is to ensure that the person who created the 
evidence is available for questioning.  Thus, the holding in Melendez-
Diaz is correct, but the opinion itself is riddled with escape hatches that 
detract from what the opinion is really about—the right to confrontation.  
For defendants to fully benefit from Sixth Amendment guarantees, the 
Supreme Court should clarify what is meant by testimonial.  The 
Crawford Court left this task for “another day.”  That day should have 
arrived on June 25, 2009––the day Melendez-Diaz was decided. 
Testimonial documents should include all forensic reports, not just 
those in affidavit form.  And simply replacing the report with the 
testimony of an analyst who had nothing to do with preparing the report 
is not a viable solution.  The greatest problems left unresolved by the 
opinion spring from the ambiguous term analyst.  In revisiting the issue, 
the Court should specify that the analyst must be the person who actually 
completed the forensic report admitted into evidence, not a co-worker, 
not an “expert,” not simply a living, breathing person capable of giving 
an opinion based on the reports of another.  Otherwise, cross- 
 
                                                     
 132. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540 (emphasis added). 
EDENFIELD FINAL 11/5/2010  8:01:20 AM 
156 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 
examination can only yield partial truths.  Defendants are entitled to the 
whole truth, and nothing but. 
 
